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ABSTRACT 
In the two years since the Unified Command Plan (UCP) was changed to 
designate U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as the lead Department of 
Defense (DoD) synchronizer for all countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) 
plans, tangible progress has been slow. Organizations such as the Pentagon’s Unity of 
Effort Council and SOCOM’s CWMD Fusion Center are billed on paper as entities that 
can assist SOCOM in understanding the nuclear counterproliferation problem and help 
SOCOM plan responses to a WMD event. However, few people within these 
organizations understand the problem, are connected with the relevant agencies within 
the U.S. government (USG), and have a clear sense of what needs to occur. Even fewer 
members of the CWMD community across the interagency (IA) are aware of SOCOM’s 
efforts. This study analyzes SOCOM’s contribution to the USG nuclear 
counterproliferation mission and arrives at four conclusions. First, Theater Special 
Operation Commands (TSOCs) are the best postured in the DoD to contribute to a 
nuclear CP mission. Second, TSOCs can leverage the experience of Theater Special 
Operations forces. Third, TSOCs must ensure that their personnel receive basic 
knowledge of nuclear technologies, proliferation networks, and USG strategy and policy 
related to nuclear non-proliferation and counterproliferation. Finally, SOCOM must 
properly integrate personnel within the interagency to properly contribute to ongoing 
counterproliferation efforts. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 
B. THE ROLE OF SOCOM IN COUNTERPROLIFERATION ..............3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................4 
D. SCOPE OF RESEARCH AND ASSUMPTIONS ...................................8 
E. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................9 
II. THE ROLE OF A THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 
IN NUCLEAR COUNTERPROLIFERATION ...............................................11 
A. DESCRIPTION OF A TSOC .................................................................11 
B. TSOC SUITABILITY FOR NUCLEAR 
COUNTERPROLIFERATION OPERATIONS ..................................12 
C. TSOCS GAPS AND LIMITATIONS.....................................................16 
D. OPTIMIZING THE TSOC .....................................................................20 
III. POTENTIAL TSOC ROLE IN USG COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
EFFORTS AGAINST A STATE ACTOR ........................................................23 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................23 
B. SCENARIO ..............................................................................................23 
C. ASSUMPTIONS .......................................................................................24 
D. THE TASK ...............................................................................................25 
E. DEPLOY SOCFWDS ..............................................................................26 
F. PREPARE THE ENVIRONMENT .......................................................26 
G. EMPLOY A PARTNER FORCE ...........................................................27 
H. ADJUST TSOC STRUCTURE ..............................................................27 
I. SUM OF EFFECTS .................................................................................28 
J. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................28 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................................................29 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ....................................................29 
B. MORE EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION WITH THE IA ...............30 
C. WHERE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF TSOCS LIE ...........................31 
D. EDUCATING THE FORCE ...................................................................32 
E. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ....................................................33 
APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR USG ORGANIZATIONS THAT 
ARE INVOLVED IN COUNTERPROLIFERATION ....................................35 
viii 
A. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY .........................................................35 
B. COMMERCE ...........................................................................................36 
C. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ..................................36 
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE .............................................................37 
E. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ..............................................................37 
F. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) ............................38 
G. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ..................................................................38 
H. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ................................................38 
APPENDIX B. WHAT EACH USG ORGANIZATION OFFERS TO THE 
COUNTERPROLIFERATION FIGHT ............................................................39 
APPENDIX C. NOTIONAL THEATER COMMAND ORGANIZATION ..............41 
APPENDIX D. NOTIONAL THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
COMMAND ORGANIZATION ........................................................................43 
APPENDIX E. SPECIAL OPERATIONS NOTIONAL COMMAND AND 
CONTROL OPTIONS ........................................................................................45 
APPENDIX F. PARTIAL LIST OF CURRENT IA NONPROLIFERATION 
AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION COURSES ............................................47 
APPENDIX G. THEATER SOF SKILL SETS THAT COULD BE 
LEVERAGED AGAINST A STATE ACTOR .................................................49 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................51 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. USG Entities and Their Capabilities ..........................................................39 
Figure 2. Notional Theater Command Organization .................................................41 
Figure 3. Notional Theater Special Operations Command Organization .................43 
Figure 4. Special Operations Notional Command and Control Options ...................45 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AOR     Area of Responsibility  
AQI     Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
 
BPC     Building Partner Capacity 
 
C2     Command and Control 
CBRN     Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 
CONOP    Concept of Operation 
CP     Counter Proliferation 
CWMD    Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
DA     Direct Action 
DHS     Department for Homeland Security 
DOC     Department of Commerce 
DoD     Department of Defense 
DOE     Department of Energy 
DOJ     Department of Justice 
DOS     Department of State 
DOT     Department of Treasury 
DNI     Director National Intelligence 
DTAAC    Declared Theater of Active Armed Conflict 
DTRA     Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
 
EXORD    Execution Order 
 
FBI     Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FID     Foreign Internal Defense 
 
GCC     Geographic Combatant Command 
GPF     General Purpose Force 
 
HN     Host Nation  
HQ     Headquarters 
 
IA     Interagency  
IC     Intelligence Community  
 
JCPOA    Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action  
JMD     Joint Manning Document 
JP     Joint Publication 
JOM     Joint Operation Model 
JSOU     Joint Special Operations University 
xii 
JTF     Joint Task Force 
 
LNO     Liaison Officers 
 
MCPI      Maritime Counterproliferation Interdiction 
MDMP    Military Decision-Making Process 
 
NAR      Nonconventional Assisted Recovery 
NDAA     National Defense Authorization Act 
NDU     National Defense University 
NMF     National Mission Force 
NPS     Naval Postgraduate School 
NPT     Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
 
ODTAAC    Outside Declared Theater of Active Armed Conflict 
OPE     Operational Preparation of the Environment 
OPLAN    Operation Plan 
 
PE EXORD    Preparation of the Environment Execution Order 
PF     Partner Force 
PN     Partner Nation 
 
RSO&I    Reception, Staging and Onward Integration 
 
SIG     Strategic Interdiction Group 
SME     Subject Matter Expert 
SOCCENT    Special Operations Command Central 
SOCFWD    Special Operations Command Forward 
SOCOM     Special Operations Command  
SOF     Special Operations Forces 
SOTF     Special Operations Task Force 
 
SR     Special Reconnaissance 
STRATCOM    Strategic Command  
 
TSOC     Theater Special Operations Command 
 
UCP     Unified Command Plan  
USC     United States Code 
USG     United States Government  
USSOCOM    United States Special Operations Command 
UW     Unconventional Warfare 
 
WMD     Weapons of Mass Destruction  
 
xiii 
LIST OF DEFINITIONS 
Counter Proliferation: “Efforts to combat the spread or growth of weapons—
conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and related technology—that 
threaten the United States.”1 
 
Covert Action: “An activity or activities of the United States Government to influence 
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the 
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”2   
 
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction: “Efforts against actors of concern to curtail the 
conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use and effects of weapons of 
mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery.”3 
 
Direct Action: “Short-duration strike and other small-scale offensive actions conducted 
as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments and 
which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, 
or damage designated targets.”4 
 
Foreign Internal Defense: “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a 
government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 
designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 
insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to it security.”5  
 
Intelligence: 1. “The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, 
evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign 
nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential 
operations. 2. The activities that result in products. 3. The organizations engage in such 
activities.”6 
                                                 
1 “FBI Counterproliferation Center,” FBI, accessed October 25, 2018, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-branch/fbi-counterproliferation-
center.   
2 Presidential approval and reporting of covert actions, 50 U.S. Code § 3093, (2014), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3093.  
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, JP 3–40 (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2014), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_40.pdf, GL-5. 
4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, JP 3–05 (Washington, DC: Joints Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf, x. 
5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense, JP 3–22 (Washington, DC: Joints Chiefs of Staff, 
2018), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_22.pdf, ix.  
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, JP 2–0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp2_0.pdf, GL-8. 
xiv 
Interagency: “Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, 
including the Department of Defense. See also interagency coordination. The interagency 
is comprised of CIA, Commerce, DHS, DoD, DOE, HHS, DOI, DOJ, DOS, DOT, 
Treasury, FBI.”7  
 
NAR: “Personnel Recovery conducted by indigenous/surrogate personnel that are 
trained, supported, and led by special operations forces, unconventional warfare ground 
and maritime forces, or other government agencies’ personnel that have been specifically 
trained and directed to establish and operate indigenous or surrogate infrastructures.”8  
 
Non-Proliferation: “The prevention of an increase or spread of something, especially the 
number of countries possessing nuclear weapons.”9 
 
Nuclear Weapon: “A weapon in which the explosion results from the energy released by 
a reaction involving atomic nuclei, either by fission—of uranium or plutonium; or, 
fusion—of a heavier nucleus with two lighter hydrogen ones.”10 
 
Operation: “A sequence of tactical actions with common purpose or unifying theme.”11 
“A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, 
or administrative military mission.”12  
 
OPE: “The conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and 
shape the operational environment.”13  
 
Oversight: “Knowledgeable, responsible scrutiny; careful management; advice and 
assistance provided to assigned subordinate organizations to ensure compliance with 
applicable laws, regulations, directives, and policies while assuring mission readiness.”14  
                                                 
7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interorganizational Cooperation, JP 3–08 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2016), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_08.pdf, GL-8. 
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Personnel Recovery, JP 3–50 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_50.pdf, GL-12. 
9 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, JP 3–40 (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2014), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_40.pdf, GL-5.  
10 James N. Yamazaki, “What Is an Atomic or Nuclear Bomb?” accessed on October 24, 2018, 
http://www.aasc.ucla.edu/cab/200708230002.html.  
11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP-1 (Washington, DC: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf, GL-10. 
12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, JP-3-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf, GL-13. 
13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, JP 3–05 (Washington, DC: Joints Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf, GL-9.  
14 Department of Defense, Implementation of DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities (U), DoD 
Instruction DoDI S-5105.63 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013).  
xv 
PE: “An umbrella term for operations and activities conducted by selectively trained 
special operations forces to develop an environment for potential future special 
operations.”15 
 
Proliferation: “Rapid increase in the number or amount of something.”16 
 
Unconventional Warfare: “Operations and activities that are conducted to enable a 
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or 
occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla 
force in a denied area.”17 
 
Weapon of Mass Destruction: “Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons 
capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, and excluding the 
means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and 
divisible part from the weapon.”18 
 
WMD Pathway: “Networks or links among individuals, groups, organizations, 
governmental entities, etc., that promote or enable the development, possession, and/or 
proliferation of WMD and related capabilities. Monitoring and controlling WMD 
pathways is essential in denying actors of concern access to WMD technology, 







                                                 
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, JP 3–05 (Washington, DC: Joints Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf, GL-9.  
16 Oxford Dictionaries, “Proliferation,” accessed October 25, 2018, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/proliferation.  
17 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, JP 3–05 (Washington, DC: Joints Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf, GL-12.  
18 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, JP 3–40 (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2014), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_40.pdf, GL-5. 
19 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, JP 3–40 (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2014), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_40.pdf, ix. 
xvi 
References for Definitions 
 
Department of Defense. Implementation of DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities (U). 
DoD Instruction DoDI S-5105.63. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
2013. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “FBI Counterproliferation Center.” Accessed October 
25, 2018. https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-
branch/fbi-counterproliferation-center.   
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. JP 3–40. Washington, 
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014. 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_40.pdf.  
———. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. JP-1. Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2013. 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf. 
———. Foreign Internal Defense. JP 3–22. Washington, DC: Joints Chiefs of Staff, 
2018. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_22.pdf. 
———. Interorganizational Cooperation. JP 3–08. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2016. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_08.pdf. 
———. Joint Intelligence. JP 2–0. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013. 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp2_0.pdf. 
———. Joint Operations. JP-3-0. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2017.  http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0_20170117.
pdf. 
————. Personnel Recovery. JP 3–50. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011. 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_50.pdf.  
———. Special Operations. JP 3–05. Washington, DC: Joints Chiefs of Staff, 2014. 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf.  






In the two years that have passed since the Unified Command Plan (UCP) was 
changed to designate U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as the lead Department 
of Defense (DoD) synchronizer for all countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) 
plans, tangible progress has been slow. The DoD CWMD campaign plan has yet to be 
completed, little collaboration with the interagency (IA) has transpired, and tangible effects 
in the mission space have yet to be realized. Meanwhile, the threat of nuclear proliferation 
continues to metastasize. This research examines potential ways Theater Special 
Operations Commands (TSOCs) can contribute to SOCOMs and the United States 
government’s (USG) nuclear counterproliferation (CP) efforts against an adversarial state 
actor. 
TSOCs, given their unique authorities, regional focus, permanent structure, and 
command culture, are ideally positioned to contribute to the USG counterproliferation 
mission. However, as currently constructed, TSOCs possess gaps that will inhibit their 
performance. These gaps include organizational structure; limited command and control 
capabilities; lack of IA collaboration; and no organic WMD subject matter expertise 
(SME). The way to rectify these gaps is to adopt a mission-oriented, target-focused 
mindset; receive additional personnel and resources to more effectively command and 
control tactical elements; improve IA collaboration through a more extensive liaison 
network; utilize the SOCOM CWMD Fusion Center as a single point of contact for DoD 
and the IA; ensure attendance of counterproliferation courses for required personnel; 
develop internal counterproliferation expertise; and establish relationships with IA SMEs. 
To understand how a TSOC could function in this space, we projected their present-
day capabilities to a near-future, steady-state, counterproliferation mission. We examined 
how a TSOC could participate in a USG effort to prevent Iran from acquiring or 
proliferating a nuclear weapon. This scenario demonstrates what the efforts of a TSOC 
would center around: Incorporate a coordination hub for information, personnel, and 
equipment; ensure TSOC personnel and Theater SOF have access to nuclear weapon 
subject matter expertise during operations; integrate/deconflict with DoD and USG 
xviii 
counterproliferation efforts; work with Theater SOF to set conditions for the Reception, 
Staging and Onward Integration (RSO&I) of other units; and ensure Theater SOF and 
Theater assets are meeting collection requirements. 
As a result of the research, the authors present four recommendations: 
• Restructure the organization. To be effective in counterproliferation 
activities, TSOCs must be willing to restructure into mission-oriented 
configurations where proliferation issues are treated as separate missions 
sets. 
• Collaborate with the IA. A TSOC’s success in the counterproliferation 
space will be heavily predicated on their collaborative efforts with the IA. 
Two starting points to improve these efforts are to: make the SOCOM 
CWMD Fusion Center the IA and DoD single point of contact for all 
things CWMD related; and establish more SOCOM liaison billets in key 
counterproliferation IA organizations.  
• Leverage the skills. Over the past 17 years, Theater SOF has developed, 
refined and employed unique skills covering intelligence collection, 
special activities, information operation, and partner force employment. 
These skills complement ongoing IA nuclear counterproliferation efforts 
while recognizing Theater SOF’s limitations in nuclear-specific skill sets. 
• Educate the Force. While most TSOCs have a counterproliferation cell of 
sorts, the personnel assigned to staff these positions are insufficiently 
educated on nuclear devices, networks, and policy guidance. To fill this 
gap, the DoD should develop an internal WMD educational plan which 
combines the nuclear counterproliferation (as well as chemical, biological 
and radiological) resources of education programs within DoD into a 
unified counterproliferation “base-line of knowledge.” 
Throughout the course of this research, prominent questions emerged that went 
outside the scope of this thesis but warrant further exploration: 
xix 
1. As DoD’s planning model seems more of a hindrance when applied to the 
counterproliferation effort, is there a viable planning model that would be 
more conducive for integrating counterproliferation missions with the IA? 
2. How does a TSOC restructure itself to be mission-oriented and integrate 
subject matter experts (SME) with its forces? 
3. What are the policy implications of permitting Theater SOF to enter an 









We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the 
long-standing rules-based international order creating a security 
environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in 
recent memory.  
—Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy1 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since the introduction of atomic weapons in 1945, the United States has developed 
three general options for addressing the security risks associated with the spread of this 
strategic capability to other nations: (1) nonproliferation regimes (preventing the 
development of a capability via treaties and other arms control mechanisms); (2) 
counterproliferation (preventing the spread of a capability, i.e., interdiction, direct action); 
and (3) consequence management (actions taken after nuclear detonation). As the 
technology needed to produce nuclear weapons started to spread widely in the 1960s, the 
United States pioneered strategies of nonproliferation and specific counterproliferation 
operations to inhibit nations from developing nuclear latency (the technical capacity to 
quickly produce and weaponize the fissile material at the heart of a nuclear weapon). To 
enable those efforts, the U.S. government developed an interagency (IA) process to 
formulate and execute policy and operational options to curtail this occurrence. Today, 
the key governmental agencies occupying this nonproliferation and counterproliferation 
space are The Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DOS), Department of 
Energy (DOE), the Intelligence Community (IC), the Department of the Treasury 
(DOTR), and Department of Commerce (DOC). 
This proliferation ecosystem is robust, complex, and a space where the 
interagency—organizations outside DoD—holds and has historically held primacy with 
respect to executing U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy.  Despite the 
                                                 
1 Jim Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America 
(Washington, DC: Pentagon, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-
Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, 1.  
2 
numerous stakeholders, this IA conglomerate, overtime, has led the U.S. effort to curb the 
spread of nuclear weapons, technology, and material across the globe through various 
actions. Some of the actions to accomplish this feat include  the imposition of sanctions, 
international import/export law enforcement, coercive diplomacy, granting security 
assurances, demarches, and covert action, to name a few. Largely driven by intelligence 
collection, analysis, and the interagency process, there are two poignant examples that 
illustrate the success of this system.  In Nicolas Miller’s journal article, “The Secret 
Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions,” Miller discusses how coercive diplomacy and the 
threat of sanctions stymied South Korea’s attempt to establish a nuclear weapons program 
in the 1970s.2 Separately, William Tobey, in “Cooperation in the Libya WMD 
Disarmament Case” describes how the combination of U.S. intelligence and sanctions 
dismantled the Libyan nuclear program in 2004.3 Though these examples display the U.S. 
non/counterproliferation community’s effectiveness over time, gaps remain in the current 
system that can be exploited by an evolving proliferation threat. Of particular concern is 
how proliferation is increasingly trans-regional and intersects legal business dealings with 
illicit proliferation activity, challenging the traditional functional and geographical 
oriented structure of many USG organizations. It is forcing several departments within the 
non/counterproliferation community to reevaluate their organizational structure and 
practices. 
DoD is one of the departments currently examining its organizations’ involvement 
in non and counterproliferation, with the ultimate aim of optimizing its contribution to the 
overall USG effort.  Since becoming more involved in the national counterproliferation 
effort in the 1990s, DoD’s primary focus has been missile defense, preparing for offensive 
operations against WMD production facilities and storage sites, and establishing defensive 
                                                 
2 Nicholas L. Miller, “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions,” International Organization 
68, no. 4 (October 2014), http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=e027e92b-
987a-40ea-b173-9728d70fe7ee%40sessionmgr4007.   
3 William Tobey, “Cooperation in the Libya WMD Disarmament Case,” Studies in Intelligence 61, 
no. 4 (December 2017), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-61-no-4/pdfs/libya-nuclear-deal.pdf.  
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countermeasures for military forces.4 Additionally, each of its services has been and 
remains responsible for training and equipping itself for combat operations in a 
contaminated environment.5 Seemingly easy, there are several sub-organizations, much 
like the IA departments, within the DoD responsible for one or more of these facets. Given 
the number of organizations and their disparate nature, a better understanding of their 
duties as well as better coordination is required. U.S. Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM) is now the lead for coordinating DoD’s CWMD effort and synchronizing it 
with the IA. Similar to its counterterrorism (CT) effort, SOCOM is actively reaching out 
to the IA to educate itself on the broader community’s responsibilities, so that it can 
ultimately find areas that it can add value, all the while minimizing duplicative efforts. A 
byproduct of SOCOM assuming this coordination role is that it can better leverage its 
internally subordinate, operational level commands and forward deployed elements to 
enable this newly synchronized CWMD effort in ways yet to be seen.  
B. THE ROLE OF SOCOM IN COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
In August 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter notified SOCOM that an 
upcoming change in the Unified Command Plan (UCP)—the document that “establishes 
the missions and geographic responsibilities among the combatant commanders,”6—
would shift the responsibility of DoD synchronizer for CWMD from the United States 
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to SOCOM. Traditionally, the role of forces assigned 
to SOCOM to counter WMD, e.g., SOF, has been 
primarily in nonproliferation and counterproliferation by providing 
expertise, materiel, and teams to support [combatant commands] to locate, 
tag, and track WMD; conduct interdiction and other offensive operations 
in limited areas as required; build partnership capacity for conducting 
counterproliferation activities; conduct military information support 
operations to dissuade adversary reliance on WMD; and other specialized 
technical capabilities, including technical reach back capabilities. 
Although SOF [has] a unique role in CWMD and operating in a [chemical, 
                                                 
4 Al Mauroni, “Improving Our CWMD Capabilities.” PRISM 7, no. 3 (2018), 43. 
5 Mauroni, 43. 
6 “Unified Combatant Commands,” Department of Defense, October 28, 2011, 
https://archive.defense.gov/ucc/.  
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biological, radiological, nuclear] (CBRN) environment, they cannot fully 
operate under CBRN threat conditions or conduct SOF-specific CWMD 
missions without the assistance of conventional forces. For example, while 
SOF [has] limited organic CBRN decontamination, reconnaissance, and 
sensitive site exploitation capability, they lack the capacity to conduct 
long-term sustainment and reconstitution operations without large-scale 
logistical resupply.7 
This role was defined in 2013, prior to the UCP change and in the context of 
renewed tensions about the North Korean, Iranian, and Syrian WMD programs.8 Since 
the UCP change, SOCOM has undertaken several initiatives that are as of this writing still 
underdevelopment to best posture itself and the DoD to counter WMD and the networks 
that proliferate them. One of the more promising initiatives is the infusion of personnel, 
resources, and expertise into the seven TSOC as part of SOCOM’s ongoing effort to 
“empower the TSOC.”9 Therefore, our research will focus on what specific capabilities 
the TSOCs can bring to bear to execute a nuclear counterproliferation mission—in 
particular, delaying or disrupting an adversarial actor’s acquisition of a nuclear 
weapon capability in a steady state environment. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our question requires the researching CWMD, the USG counterproliferation 
effort, and the role of SOCOM in counterproliferation. Below is a review of some of the 
prominent academic research on these topics. 
Students at the Naval Postgraduate School have analyzed the USG CWMD 
enterprise and suggested ways to improve the effectiveness of counterproliferation policy. 
In one such thesis, “Too Big to Fail,” the authors argued that “designating a CWMD lead-
                                                 
7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, 
JP 3–11,  (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_11.pdf, F-3. 
8 James R. Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Director of National Defense, 2013), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2013%20ATA%20SFR%20for%20SSCI%
2012%20Mar%202013.pdf; “Iran,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2018, 
https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/; “Syria,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 2018, 
https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/syria/. 
9 Linda Robinson et al., Improving the Understanding of Special Operations, RR-2026 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2026.html, 136–140. 
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proponent agency for the CWMD community would align the authorities, funding, and 
resources required at the policy level and provide an organization accountable for 
executing the national CWMD strategy.”10 At face value, this recommendation appears to 
carry merit. All USG efforts aligned under one organization, single point of contact for 
anything CWMD related, and defined accountability for everything that goes right as well 
as wrong with regard to this problem set. Where the authors may fall short in their 
assessment is that, in a problem set that is beleaguered by multiple competing 
organizations, just creating a “WMD tzar” would do little more than add another layer of 
bureaucracy. Short of reorganizing the entire USG toward functional areas such as 
counterterrorism or CWMD, this proposal would likely cause more issues than it solves. 
An alternative approach is to create permanent, mission-focused teams that cut across the 
bureaucracy through the inclusion of all WMD oriented IA organizations at the 
working/O-6 and below level to effectively counter WMD. 
In a recent examination of SOCOM’s role in preventing the development, 
acquisition, spread and use of WMD, Erik Stanfield argued that learning the CWMD terms 
and specialized language(s) already in use throughout the various expert communities and 
utilizing target-focused collaboration around WMD threat pathways11 are two of the most 
effective courses of action that SOCOM can employ in order to positively contribute to 
the overall USG WMD fight. He explains that: 
The majority of the international community and U.S. interagency describe 
their organizational roles along the three “proliferation pillars” 
(nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management), 
while DoD uses the construct CWMD. These two dialects share many 
commonalities, but a lack of mutual understanding has led to confusion 
and friction in CWMD interagency working groups. Education – within 
SOCOM and among partners—is the first step in diffusing 
misunderstandings.12  
 
                                                 
10 William T. Cunningham, Brian J. Dowd, Samuel Kim, Tad Tsuneyoshi, and Adam Woytowich, 
“Too Big To Fail: The U.S. Government Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Enterprise,” 89. 
11 Erik J. Stanfield, “Lost in Translation: Lessons from Counterterrorism for a More Proactive 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 10, 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/55539, 58.  
12 Stanfield, 58. 
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He goes on to say that 
consensus on CWMD language must start with a shared understanding of 
a clear objective. WMD threat pathways represent concrete, limited-scope 
objects around which agencies can collaborate effectively. Analysis of 
WMD pathway choke points and networks nodes provides a common point 
of discussion along these lines (i.e., target-focused collaboration).13  
Though Stanfield makes several well-founded points throughout his thesis, his 
focus on commonality of language and target-focused collaboration are not the 
fundamental concerns for DoD’s role within CWMD. The salient point that his findings 
drive toward is that DoD has not prioritized CWMD strategy and operations despite 
several high-level policy documents saying otherwise (reference the 2017 National 
Security Strategy, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Joint 
Publication 3–40). This lack of prioritization, as seen through the defense budget, 
resources, authorities and personnel allocated to the counterterrorism fight over the 
CWMD fight for the past 17+ years, is pervasive throughout DoD.14 This lack of 
prioritization of CWMD in DoD has crippled DoD and SOCOM’s ability to effectively 
contribute to USG counterproliferation efforts. 
Stanfield uses the targeting of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as his primary example of 
how SOCOM effectively contributed to IA counterterrorism efforts. He champions this 
example as a model for how SOCOM can affect CWMD operations. Though he admits 
counterterrorism operations are not analogous to CWMD operations, he does not go far 
enough in illustrating the differences between the two. The counterterrorism operations of 
the early 2000s, especially those conducted against AQI, were against a non-state actor in 
a Declared Theater of Active Armed Conflict (DTAAC). These two variables alter the 
USG’s response against a given adversary. Operating in a DTAAC environment where 
the U.S. military has Title 10 authority to act against an enemy (such as a non-state actor) 
and where international law lends legitimacy to the targeting and dismantling of a 
                                                 
13 Stanfield, 58. 
14 Timothy M. Bonds et al., Strategy-Policy Mismatch: How the U.S. Army Can Help Close Gaps in 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/j.ctt14bs2zp.10.pdf, 13. 
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designated terrorist organization stand in sharp contrast to CWMD. In CWMD operations, 
the USG often has to operate in an Outside Declared Theater of Active Armed Conflict 
(ODTAAC) environment in which state actors are frequently involved, but the use of force 
is seldom considered and the support of the international community can be lacking or 
fickle. Instead of altering its vernacular and adopting a target-focused approach to go after 
WMD, SOCOM should instead focus its efforts on finding ways to complement ongoing 
USG counterproliferation initiatives, such as leveraging its intelligence collection 
capabilities to help answer WMD-specific national intelligence priorities. 
Colonel Lonnie Carlson and Dr. Margaret Kosal expanded on Stanfield’s thesis in 
a follow-on article, concluding that: 
The USG and DoD must build and leverage the global SOF network 
through CWMD Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) and 
building partner capacity (BPC) activities to provide the early warning 
needed to mitigate fleeting opportunities to eliminate catastrophic WMD 
risks.15 
While utilizing Theater SOF’s organic OPE capabilities in support of CWMD 
objectives is a potentially worthwhile endeavor, SOCOM should be mindful of CWMD 
BPC focused efforts. Utilizing Theater SOF’s requisite skills, training, equipment, 
experience and access and placement to conduct OPE in support of answering national 
intelligence priorities, particularly of the WMD variety, could be a valuable application 
of deployed personnel and resources. The current limitation in utilizing Theater SOF for 
WMD-related OPE is that TSOCs and Theater SOF often do not possess the requisite 
knowledge required to contend with the technical and nuanced nature of the threat. 
Therefore, any OPE that is conducted needs to be focused on objectives that do not require 
advanced technical knowledge of WMD, WMD-related infrastructure, WMD-related 
components or Theater SOF elements requiring subject matter expert (SME) support.  
Though “effective BPC efforts can help [to] overcome” a lack of partner 
participation in CWMD efforts and thus help to lift the USG burden to act unilaterally, 
                                                 
15 Lonnie Carlson and Margaret Kosal, “Preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation: 
Leveraging Special Operations Forces to Shape the Environment,” (occasional paper, Center for Special 
Operations Studies and Research, JSOU Press, 2017), 18, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=798283. 
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DoD and by extension SOCOM, is not always the best positioned to engage with Partner 
Nations (PN) on CWMD BPC.16 This is due to three main reasons: Theater SOF often 
only works with other militaries that have very little to do with a PN’s CWMD efforts (if 
those efforts exist to begin with), PNs are often only focused on counterterrorism 
missions, and Theater SOF are often not trained themselves on the technical skill sets 
required to counter WMD. What Theater SOF can and should focus CWMD BPC efforts 
on are skill sets that are firmly within Theater SOF’s bailiwick: Direct Action (DA) and 
Special Reconnaissance (SR). These skill sets should be focused on because they can be 
easily applied to both counterterrorism and nuclear counterproliferation efforts and do not 
require any additional investment by SOCOM. By ensuring Partner Force (PF) 
competency and proficiency in these areas, the PF will be better postured to execute both 
counterterrorism and WMD missions. 
D. SCOPE OF RESEARCH AND ASSUMPTIONS 
DoD typically uses “CWMD” to cover the spectrum of efforts that could be 
applied toward dissuading, preventing, countering, or dealing with the consequences of 
proliferation. We have focused our study on the spectrum of activities that constitute 
counterproliferation, in particular nuclear counterproliferation. We acknowledge that in 
certain instances, what applies to nuclear counterproliferation could also apply to 
chemical, biological, and radiological counterproliferation. Our research involved non-
attributable interviews and primary government documents from across the IA. All of the 
information presented in this thesis is done so at the unclassified level to ensure the widest 
possible readership. We further acknowledge the plethora of ongoing efforts across the IA 
and within DoD to prevent nuclear proliferation. Given the enormous contributions that 
exist, we have refrained from summarizing most of them and direct the reader to Annex 
A as well as the other academic works that cover these contributions.17 
                                                 
16 Carlson and Margaret, 12. 




To further focus this project, we made the following assumptions: 
1. There is a role for SOCOM, TSOCs and Theater SOF to play in nuclear 
counterproliferation. 
2. SOCOM and the TSOCs recognize that they do not have primacy in any 
nuclear counterproliferation efforts at this time.  
3. DoD wants SOCOM to be more active operationally in nuclear 
counterproliferation. 
4. TSOCs and Theater SOF will be asked to perform the majority (greater 
than 50%) of the nuclear counterproliferation missions for DoD. 
5. TSOCs and Theater SOF will not duplicate the efforts of the National 
Mission Force (NMF). 
6. TSOCs will be supported with the appropriate funding, manning, 
resources, training, equipment, authorities and permissions to execute 
nuclear counterproliferation missions. 
7. Not all TSOCs are created equally or operate in the same way.  
8. TSOCs are heavily influenced by how they are resourced, manned, the 
region in which they operate, as well as the bureaucratic constraints 
placed on them by their respective geographic combatant command 
(GCC). 
E. METHODOLOGY 
With this topic being inductive in nature, our research led us to gain an 
understanding of the current policies, plans, doctrine, and capabilities of the USG 
counterproliferation efforts. This knowledge enabled us to achieve our primary effort, the 
conceptualization of the future role a TSOC may have in the USG’s counterproliferation 
efforts against an adversarial state actor in a steady-state environment. Chapter II provides 
an overview of a TSOC’s roles and responsibilities, their suitability for nuclear 
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counterproliferation operations, gaps and limitations, and how SOCOM can potentially 
assist TSOCs in addressing those gaps and limitations. Official USG documents and 
academic papers were relied on to complete the chapter. Chapter III explores how a TSOC, 
with present day capabilities, could be used to bolster USG counterproliferation efforts in 
a scenario where an adversarial state actor has signaled to the USG that they intend to 
acquire weapons grade, fissile material. Iran was selected to fill the role of the adversarial 
state actor for two reasons. The first was to illustrate some of the complexities that a TSOC 
would face in the context of a real-world actor. Second, based on of their actions over the 
last 30 years, Iran could pursue a nuclear weapon in a post Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA) world.18 The purpose of Chapter III is not to provide a comprehensive 
plan for how a TSOC should assist the USG in a counterproliferation scenario. Rather, it 
is to inform the reader of the challenges and opportunities a TSOC could face. The basis 
of knowledge for Chapter III is rooted in numerous non-attributable interviews within the 
DoD, IA, IC, as well as the authors’ almost 40 years of combined SOF experience. Finally, 
Chapter IV offers our recommendations to improve TSOCs ability to contribute to the 
USG’s nuclear counterproliferation efforts. These recommendations are based on the 
numerous non-attributable interviews we conducted with individuals from across the IA. 
Our project concludes with recommendations for future areas of exploration based off of 
questions that arose during our research.  
 
 
                                                 
18 “Iran,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2018, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/.  
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II. THE ROLE OF A THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
COMMAND IN NUCLEAR COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
To explore the role TSOCs will have in counter nuclear operations, one must 
understand a TSOC’s purpose, its gaps and limitations. This chapter will introduce 
TSOCs, explain why they are suitable for counter nuclear operations, highlight their gaps 
and limitations, and finally, propose how SOCOM and its subordinate TSOCs can fill 
those gaps.  
A. DESCRIPTION OF A TSOC 
A TSOC is “a subordinate unified command established by a combatant 
commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations.”19 In 
layman’s terms, a TSOC oversees and interfaces with all Theater SOF within its area of 
responsibility (AOR) to ensure that those forces are acting in accordance with the GCC 
commander’s guidance and intent. Doctrinally, TSOCs have five required capabilities: 
1. “Possess an optimized centralized organizational structure to 
support core, theater, and mission-specific operations that supports 
GCC requirements as envisioned in the Chairman’s Global SOF 
Campaign Plan.”20 
2. “Possess the ability to form the core of a Joint Task Force (JTF) 
Headquarters (HQ).”21 
3. “Possess the ability to command and control (C2) distributed SOF 
and integrate with partners and General Purpose Force (GPF) from 
the TSOC proper or a Special Operations Command Forward 
(SOCFWD).”22 
                                                 
19 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, JP 3–05, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf, GL-12. 
20 Michael Tisdel et al., Theater Special Operations Commands Realignment, ADA607289 (MacDill 
AFB, FL: SOCOM, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a607289.pdf, 7. 
21 Tisdel et al., 7. 
22 Tisdel et al., 7. 
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4. “Possess the ability to develop and maintain shared situational 
awareness and understanding.”23 
5. “Possess the ability to coordinate and collaborate with interagency 
and mission partners.”24 
If these five capabilities truly exist, then TSOCs should have the ability to shift 
part of their focus from counterterrorism to nuclear counterproliferation operations and 
have immediate impact.  
B. TSOC SUITABILITY FOR NUCLEAR COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
OPERATIONS 
TSOCs can be defined by three key attributes: a permanent command structure, 
regional expertise, and a command culture that is oriented toward addressing amorphous 
problems.25  These attributes, coupled with unique authorities, permissions, and a broad 
geographic force distribution, make TSOCs ideally positioned within DoD to contribute 
to the USG nuclear counterproliferation mission. 
Permanent command structures are permanent because they are codified by law. 
In the case of a TSOC, their existence is codified by 10 USC § 167.26 This codification 
ensures funding and personnel are allocated to them on an annual basis which enables 
planning and resource allocation for future needs.27 Conversely, a non-permanent 
command structure, such as a task force, is limited by the specific, often temporary, 
mission it was established for making it unsuitable to contend with evolving complexities 
and enduring nature of difficult problems such as nuclear counterproliferation.28 
Additionally, non-permanent commands are subject to disbandment when newly elected 
policy makers no longer consider the reasons for its establishment to be valid. Therefore, 
                                                 
23 Tisdel et al., 7. 
24 Tisdel et al., 7. 
25 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–05, I-8, III-5-12. 
26 Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces, 10 USC § 167 (2016), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/167.  
27 Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces. 
28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–05, II-1. 
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a permanent command, like a TSOC, provides the stability and long-term focus necessary 
to effectively address the threat posed by nuclear proliferation. 
As was seen with the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network, nuclear 
proliferation is often a problem set that is characterized by its ability to be trans-regional 
and can cross several domains (technology, information, people, finances, networks, 
etc.).29 TSOCs are designed and empowered to oversee entire AORs, which span multiple 
borders, time zones, and cultures. This ability to hold a “wide-angle” view is essential to 
countering nuclear threats due to the propensity for people, knowledge, and resources to 
transcend traditional borders. 
Beyond looking across entire AORs, TSOCs offer a unique level of regional 
awareness because of their geographic focus. Daily interactions with theater and partner 
forces avail TSOCs with unfiltered information. This first-hand knowledge contributes to 
TSOCs’ unique understanding of regional dynamics, players, and tactics. Though Theater 
SOF are often not located within the countries of greatest nuclear proliferation concern, 
they are frequently in the surrounding countries. Through this access and placement, 
TSOCs, via Theater SOF, may be able to obtain information that may yield results in the 
form of intelligence collection, situational awareness, and strategic indicators and 
warnings of nuclear proliferation activities. 
A trait that is often attributed to SOF is their ability to think along abstract, non-
linear pathways that aid in the resolving of complex, ill-defined problems. The value of 
this type of thinking is captured in Joint Publication 3–05, “SOF can be formed into 
versatile, self-contained teams that provide a [Joint Force Commander] with a flexible 
force capable of operating in ambiguous and swiftly changing scenarios.”30 Furthermore, 
SOF can “provide unconventional options for addressing ambiguous situations.”31 
Looking at nuclear proliferation, one would find a problem set that is often beleaguered 
                                                 
29 David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies, (New 
York, NY: Free Press, 2010), 35–43. 
30 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–05, x. 
31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–05, II-3. 
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by compounding complexities and technical nuances. Leveraging a SOF command like a 
TSOC, one would find a central repository of individuals oriented toward solving 
ambiguous problems, bolstered by real world counterterrorism experience that can cross 
over to nuclear counterproliferation. This experience encompasses: 
• Intelligence Collection 
• Information Mapping 
• Special Activities 
• Employment of a PF 
• Employment of Theater Assets and Platforms 
An existing authority that enables Intelligence Collection, Information Mapping, 
and Special Activities for counterterrorism operations is the Counterterrorism Execution 
Order (CT EXORD). Traditionally, this EXORD has been applied to the counterterrorism 
problem set; however, as currently written, it could be applied in the nuclear 
counterproliferation domain. The CT EXORD outlines the following Preparation of the 
Environment (PE) activities that TSOCs can direct Theater SOF to conduct in both 
counterterrorism and counterproliferation operations: 
• Passive observation 
• Area Familiarization 
• Site survey 
• Mapping the information environment 
• Military Source Operations 
• Development of Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR) capabilities 
• Development of courier networks 
• Development of safe houses and assembly areas 
15 
• Preposition transportation assets 
• Cache emplacement and recovery 




• Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration (RSO&I) 
• Terminal Guidance32 
All of the aforementioned mission sets TSOCs and Theater SOF currently trains 
to; is equipped for; and possess real world experience due to 17+ years of combat 
operations. Lastly, it is important to note where the real value in the information that is 
garnered from these authorities lies. It lies with the intelligence specialists that reside at 
the TSOCs and other intelligence organizations that are able turn this raw information into 
useable intelligence.  
An authority that could enable TSOCs and Theater SOF in this realm is 10 USC § 
1208. 1208, as it is commonly referred to, is derived from section 1208 of the FY 2005–
2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This provision of the NDAA 
authorizes SOF to train, equip, and employ a PF in support of counterterrorism objectives. 
Unlike the PE EXORD, there is no language in the authority that would enable a TSOC 
to utilize this authority for counterproliferation outright. The key with using this authority 
to achieve counterproliferation effects is to find opportunities that can satisfy both 
counterterrorism and counterproliferation objectives.33 Similar to the CT EXORD is the 
                                                 
32 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations PE EXORD, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2012). (S) 
33 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108–375, 
118 Stat. 2086 (2005). https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ375/pdf/PLAW-108publ375.pdf.  
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CWMD Preparation of the Environment EXORD. The CWMD PE EXORD enables may 
of the same activities as the CT EXORD, but does so in a WMD context. Other examples 
of current authorities that can be leveraged by TSOCs and Theater SOF to immediately 
contribute to the USG’s nuclear counterproliferation efforts are the Maritime 
Counterproliferation Interdiction EXORD (MCPI) and the WMD Maritime Interdiction 
EXORD. TSOCs and Theater SOF will eventually need more specific counterproliferation 
authorities if the USG wants SOF to have major impacts in nuclear counterproliferation 
efforts. However, until that occurs, there are plenty of authorities that SOF currently 
possess that can be repurposed for nuclear counterproliferation effects.  
C. TSOCS GAPS AND LIMITATIONS 
Despite TSOCs possessing the potential to contend with the nuclear 
counterproliferation problem, they are not currently optimized to contribute effectively to 
USG nuclear counterproliferation efforts. Below are the TSOCs’ most significant gaps: 
1. “Current organizational structure limits their ability to support 
GCC requirements as envisioned in the Chairman’s Global SOF 
Campaign Plan.”34 
2. “Do not possess or have limited ability to form the core of a JTF 
Headquarters.”35  
3. “Do not possess or only have a limited ability to execute C2 over 
distributed SOF and/or integrate with partners and GPF to 
effectively influence the GCCs battle space.”36 
4. “Do not possess or only have a limited ability to develop and 
maintain shared situational awareness to support the planning and 
executions of GCCs foundational activities.”37 
                                                 
34 Tisdel et al., 8. 
35 Tisdel et al., 9. 
36 Tisdel et al., 9. 
37 Tisdel et al., 11. 
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5. “Do not possess or only have a limited ability to coordinate and 
collaborate with IA and mission partners to accomplish regional 
objectives.”38 
6. Limited to no organic WMD expertise and possess only limited 
reach back to WMD expertise within the IA. 
It is noteworthy that these gaps overlap with the required capabilities TSOCs are 
supposed to possess. Effectively saying, TSOCs in their current state are deficient in their 
ability to execute their required tasks. In nuclear counterproliferation, this is particularly 
troubling given that the ability to organize around a problem set, command and control 
distributed forces, coordinate with mission partners, and utilize relevant subject matter 
expertise are vital to conducting effective nuclear counterproliferation operations. These 
deficiencies are due, in part, to the TSOCs being neglected over the last 17 years: 
Since 9/11, U.S Special Operations [SOCOM] has experienced staggering 
growth and operations tempo—nearly doubling in manpower, tripling in 
budget, and quadrupling in deployments—while TSOCs were largely 
ignored... As a result, the SOCOM enterprise grew, while at the regional 
level the ability to C2 SOF and collaborate with the IA in steady-state 
environments remained static.39 
The configuration of a TSOC (refer to Annex C) could be characterized as a rigid 
hierarchy that is not well postured to affect amorphous problems, such as those found in 
nuclear counterproliferation. Given that all “TSOCs have different organizational 
structures, capabilities, and capacities, SOCOM does not intend to standardize the TSOCs, 
but rather intends to ensure each one possesses the requisite core capabilities to plan and 
execute the full spectrum of special operations and activities commensurate with GCC’s 
SOF requirements.”40 If SOCOM’s end-state for TSOCs is to possess the essential 
capabilities to engage in nuclear counterproliferation, then TSOCs must evolve from their 
current organizational structure that is “egregiously short of sufficient quantity and quality 
                                                 
38 Tisdel et al., 11. 
39 Richard S. Woolshlager and Fredrick J. Wright, “Force of Choice: Optimizing Theater Special 
Operations Commands to Achieve Synchronized Effects,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2012), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/27922, 7. 
40 Tisdel et al., 8. 
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of staff and intelligence, analytical, and planning resources”41 and underneath several 
layers of bureaucracy, to one that is better suited to adapt to the evolving nature of the 
threat. 
Command and control, the application “of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission” is essential for a command to oversee disaggregate forces.42 The security 
environment today “often precludes the employment of large JTFs. In order to effectively 
employ flexible, low signature, or small footprint capabilities, TSOCs require the ability 
to manage distributed operations.” Globally integrated operations, such as those found in 
nuclear counterproliferation operations, “require a forward based and agile C2 structure 
[that] quickly combine[s] capabilities with service components, the interagency, and 
[PF].”43 Simply put, TSOCs need a more effective means in which to command and 
control Theater SOF. 
Interagency collaboration is imperative if TSOCs are to effectively contribute to 
the nuclear counterproliferation effort. Leaders often pay lip service to the importance of 
IA-DoD collaboration, but as Dr. Robyn Klein explains: 
Each department or agency at the federal level has unique roles, 
responsibilities, authorities, and processes that shapes its perspective, 
equities, and operations. Unity of command resides with the President and 
typically not with a single department or agency lead, which means our 
system requires that departments and agencies support a “unity of effort” 
model, both in steady state and during crisis. This is not unique to CWMD, 
but means that CWMD efforts across departments and agencies will 
always benefit from shared understanding of problems and close 
collaboration on the integrated sets of options to address them.44 
The utility of the TSOCs collaborating with the interagency is that it expedites the 
exchange of ideas, people, and resources, particularly in crisis. However, two obstacles 
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prohibit this partnership from fulfilling its potential. First, TSOCs position in the military 
hierarchy limits its ability to go outside of the chain of command and forge formal, direct 
relationships (at the working/O-6 and below level) with other governmental 
agencies.45 Second, TSOCs lack the authority and resources to embed personnel directly 
in those governmental organizations to foster the collaborative working relationships that 
could pay dividends in nuclear counterproliferation operations. Should these two primary 
obstacles be overcome, it could chart a path to TSOC relevance in the aforementioned 
mission space. 
Another area of concern is the TSOCs use of formalized military planning 
documents, processes, and models such as Operation Plans (OPLAN), Campaign Plans, 
Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and the Joint Operation Model. These plans, 
processes and models are the foundational methodologies that DoD and by extension the 
TSOCs, use to identify, plan for, resource, and leverage action against potential and 
imminent threats. The issue that has developed over the years of employing these plans, 
processes, and models is that they have stifled asymmetric thinking and encouraged one-
dimensional, linear thought - the antithesis of SOF values. For example, the MDMP “was 
developed for conventional warfare scenarios whereby contact with the enemy is made 
upon commencement of the operation, and the timing of that contact can be more-or-less 
calculate[d]. More modern operations [such as nuclear counterproliferation] on the other 
hand do not afford planners this planning time before commencement of an” operation.46 
Even in doctrine, there are allowances for the shortcomings of these processes. Joint 
Publication 5–0 states that “the actual [Joint Operation Model] phases used will vary 
(compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with the joint campaign or operation and be 
determined by the [Joint Force Commander].’ Thus, the six phases (Shape, Deter, Seize 
Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, Enable Civil Authority) may not even apply for a given 
campaign.”47 These are two salient examples of why traditional military planning 
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processes are often not the preferred constructs in which to solve problems, especially one 
as complex as nuclear proliferation. Rather than exclusively planning, TSOCs should 
apply their understanding of the operational environment and proliferation threat to an 
action-oriented counterproliferation effort in collaboration with relevant IA partners. The 
inherent challenge with such an effort is recognizing that nuclear counterproliferation is 
not a single mission, but rather multiple, interconnected complex missions. As such, each 
facet of the mission will require different strategies, policy considerations, legal 
frameworks, resources and will be addressed by different USG agencies. Given these 
considerations, if TSOCs expect to be effective, they must be prepared to provide support 
and complement ongoing efforts, whenever and wherever needed throughout the entire 
spectrum of nuclear proliferation—from knowledge/technology proliferation to 
acquisition of a nuclear weapon.  
D. OPTIMIZING THE TSOC 
If SOCOM and TSOCs, intend on contributing to the USG effort to curb the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, knowledge, and technologies, they must evolve their 
modus operandi to minimize and overcome the bureaucratic hurdles and organizational 
frictions inherent in the USG. An initial step toward this change would be to adopt an 
alternate planning methodology, as the current operational plan phases and MDMP 
templates are insufficient. 
Adopting a mission-oriented, target-focused framework and applying it to the 
nuclear proliferation problem would better prepare a TSOC to contend with the 
complexities and ever-changing nature of the threat. With a reframed mindset and 
structure, TSOCs could begin to understand the multiple dimensions of nuclear 
counterproliferation—key actors, supply chain networks, and nuclear weapons 
technology, to name a few. With a more holistic understanding of the nuclear proliferation 
threat, TSOCs would be better able to optimize themselves by restructuring and staffing 
the command as AOR-specific nuclear proliferation issues dictate. One way of doing so 
would be to adopt the mission center construct, where organizations structure themselves 
around target issues rather than an organizational function, resulting in uninterrupted 
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access to every capability within an organization and limited bureaucratic obstacles. In 
the case of TSOCs, they could organize into nodes, bearing all the capabilities of the 
TSOC (human resources, intelligence, operations, logistics, operational planning, and 
communications), that represent key points in the nuclear weapons acquisition process—
nuclear fuel cycle, delivery systems, and weapons development. This method does not 
replace or duplicate the current J-code construct, but rather augments it. In order to achieve 
this alignment, administrative constraints such as the Joint Manning Document (JMD) 
would need to be reassessed to ensure compatibility with alternative structures better 
suited to the mission. This would necessitate that the personnel being brought in to fill 
these billets possess the requisite knowledge to work nuclear counterproliferation issues 
or would be allowed the time to attend recognized courses (see Annex F) that could 
provide them the fundamental knowledge to effectively understand the problem and 
contribute to solutions. Furthermore, since “most special operations require non-SOF 
assistance,”48 the personnel that fill these billets do not need to be SOF-qualified, but 
should be able to learn/understand how SOF functions and contributes to the 
counterproliferation space.  
In the same vein, TSOCs must be afforded sufficient personnel to fill the 
Command and Staff billets at SOCFWDs.  These long-term, forward commands are the 
practitioners of persistent engagement and are likely the commands that would be most 
familiar with the issues of the area.49 They should not be subject to the same augmentation 
as short-term, Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs), but should instead have dedicated 
staff in longer-term billets to provide the depth of experience and continuity needed to 
effectively conduct operations in support of counterproliferation. Additionally, these 
elements should be provided the requisite technical equipment that would facilitate rapid 
communications between the SOCFWD, its subordinate ground units, and the TSOC. The 
totality of these measures would greatly aid the TSOC in commanding and controlling 
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Theater SOF units more effectively, enabling TSOCs to be more responsive, situationally 
aware, and postured for action in the counterproliferation space.  
As interagency collaboration is imperative in the counterproliferation mission 
space, TSOCs must build direct relationships with interagency partners at the working/O-
6 and below level. Possible starting points include:  
• Embedding Liaison Officers (LNOs) in key nuclear counterproliferation-
focused IA organizations. 
• Utilizing the SOCOM CWMD Fusion Center as a central DoD point of 
contact for the IA. 
• Utilizing the existing IA education network to properly train TSOC 
personnel on nuclear counterproliferation matters.  
• Developing reach back capabilities to subject matter experts (SMEs) 
throughout the IA. 
Lastly, in order to be a relevant participant in the nuclear counterproliferation 
mission space, a premium must be placed on developing, acquiring, and having access to 
pertinent subject matter expertise both internal and external to the TSOC. Access to 
interagency subject matter expertise does reside within select DoD entities, but such 
expertise often does not percolate to SOCOM, let alone the TSOCs. By prioritizing 
training, information-sharing, and networking the IA, DoD, SOCOM, and TSOCs all 
stand to benefit from enhanced professional development and relationships that can be 
later leveraged to strengthen USG nuclear counterproliferation efforts. 
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III. POTENTIAL TSOC ROLE IN USG 
COUNTERPROLIFERATION EFFORTS AGAINST A STATE 
ACTOR 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Iran presents a unique opportunity in that it is an adversarial nation that has a 
known interest in pursuing a nuclear weapon but has yet to do so, making it the perfect 
template for proposing new, potentially applicable ideas. This chapter presents a plausible, 
near-future scenario where an active USG counterproliferation effort is ongoing. Provided 
a good understanding of the situation, a TSOC, if leveraged properly, could add value to 
the ongoing counterproliferation efforts vis-á-vis Iran. 
B. SCENARIO  
In August 2021, the United States received all-source reporting indicating Iran 
intends to begin the construction of a covert uranium enrichment facility outside the terms 
of the JCPOA, and beyond the purview of the IAEA. Ostensibly, Iran has continued to 
abide by the terms of the JCPOA, despite the United States’ withdrawal from the 
agreement. As a result of the United States re-imposing the pre-JCPOA sanctions in 
November 2018,50 European, allied, and partner countries have refrained from conducting 
business in Iran, out of fear of being sanctioned themselves by the USG. In spite of these 
sanctions, Iran’s economy has limped along through trade with the China and Russia. 
However, those transactions have not been able to prevent Iran’s economy from spiraling 
downward, creating greater internal pressure on the Iranian regime from their young 
population, which has grown weary of the traditional life offered by conservative Shi’a 
Islam, a lack of employment opportunities, and limited interaction with the rest of the 
world. Emboldened by the actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
                                                 
50 Matthew Lee, “US Reimposes all Iran Sanctions Filed Under Nuclear Deal,” The Washington Post, 




(DPRK)51 and fearful of a Libya-like scenario playing out in Iran, Tehran has made the 
strategic decision to pursue a nuclear weapon.52 
Though the USG was hopeful that the re-imposition of pre-JCPOA sanctions 
would bring Iran back to the negotiating table, it appears those efforts have failed. While 
the USG is, for the moment, committed to avoiding in another war in the Middle East, the 
all-source reporting is very concerning. The current strategy is to delay and disrupt Iranian 
efforts to acquire enough highly enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon. Despite 
diplomatic efforts to renegotiate a new, more comprehensive nuclear agreement having 
stalled, the USG has not yet disclosed its awareness of Iran’s covert actions to construct a 
new enrichment facility.  
Due to the early warning of Iran’s intent to begin construction of a covert 
enrichment facility, the USG is able to consider a greater array of options to prevent the 
construction and use of this facility. As such, the National Security Council tasks the IA, 
namely DOS, DOC, DOTR, and DoD to develop options for preventing Iran from covertly 
acquiring fissile material. Per the 2017 Unified Command Plan change that made SOCOM 
the lead CWMD coordinating authority for DoD, SOCOM begins planning and 
coordinating DoD’s response. Part of that planning includes tasking Special Operations 
Command Central (SOCCENT) to assist the IC in intelligence collection operations that 
would help inform USG policymakers. SOCCENT is not authorized to operate within 
sovereign Iranian territory, but has freedom of movement in the areas and countries 
surrounding Iran.  
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
This scenario is presented with certain assumptions and constraints. We assume 
that SOCOM’s Fusion Center would be serving as the central DoD point of contact for 
internal DoD coordination and integration with the IA. We also assume that SOCOM and 
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CENTCOM would leverage the resident capability of SOCCENT. Likewise, it is assumed 
that although the IC assess its reporting on Iran as high-confidence, there has been no 
significant change in SOF authorities. More specifically, SOF are not authorized to 
operate in Iranian territory, given the absence of diplomatic and mil-to-mil relationships. 
However, they do have authority to work with and in the neighboring countries. 
D. THE TASK 
Conducting Iran-targeted, nuclear counterproliferation presents an enormous 
challenge given the hostile relationship with the U.S. and the United States’ subsequent 
restrictions on military forces. The efficacy of SOF, let alone a TSOC, is called into 
question because of these limiting factors. It is therefore incumbent upon a TSOC to focus 
its efforts on areas that complement the broader USG. Of the several questions that arise 
from this tasking, many of which are strategic intelligence requirements, the TSOC should 
focus on operational level efforts that may aid strategic efforts and/or provide context to 
some of those strategic national intelligence priorities. Some of those focused questions 
are 
1. Where are the locations of key nuclear-related infrastructure in Iran? 
2. From where, to where, and how does Iran export/import nuclear 
weapons-related material and equipment? 
3. Where are the known proliferation locations within and around Iran? 
4. What intelligence gaps and limitations does the IA have with respect to 
Iran nuclear counterproliferation? 
5. What support does the IA require from DoD and vice versa? 
For this scenario, those questions could best be answered if the TSOC focused its 
contribution along four lines of effort: deploy the SOCFWDs, prepare the environment, 
identify and employ a partner force, and adjust its structure. 
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E. DEPLOY SOCFWDS 
SOCFWDs present a customizable, rapidly deployable capability that can be used 
for a host of reasons, including intelligence collection. As a direct link to the TSOC, this 
element could serve as an initial sensor for intelligence or as a conduit for future SOF to 
partner with what the SOCFWD considers to be the unit of most value, with respect to the 
Iranian nuclear proliferation threat. These tailorable commands, should it be determined 
necessary, could be the hub for SOF special activities in one or more of those countries 
surrounding Iran. In more practical terms, this would entail establishing a SOCFWD in 
Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and/or Azerbaijan, ostensibly to strengthen the U.S.—partner 
nation mil-to-mil relationship. However, in a more clandestine fashion, the SOCFWD, 
with the appropriate staff and reach back to the IA, could develop the operational and 
tactical intelligence picture. This approach may allow the IC to focus on more strategic 
elements of Iran’s nuclear program, while also offering some context to the IC. 
F. PREPARE THE ENVIRONMENT 
With access to Iran’s peripheral countries and bodies of water, TSOCs must 
leverage existing authorities to characterize specific areas and routes to the target country 
and to prepare and maintain infrastructure and equipment that could be used in future 
escalated actions. These TSOC-driven actions serve two purposes. They signal the United 
States’ resolve to Iran, and that the United States is taking the necessary steps to escalate 
this counterproliferation effort should it be required. Additionally, they provide 
preparatory and staging infrastructure for those U.S. forces selected to conduct action 
against Iran, should it be required. These preparation activities have paid dividends in the 
past, a notable example in recent history being the infrastructure in Jalalabad, Pakistan 
used by SOF in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. This platform allowed SOF to stage 
and respond to al-Qaeda and the Taliban within one month of the 9/11 attacks. In this Iran 
scenario, establishing infrastructure would alleviate great pressure for the IC to take on 
such efforts and leave it to establishing the most sensitive of sites, if the IC deems that 
necessary. 
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G. EMPLOY A PARTNER FORCE 
A TSOC must employ SOF in as many capacities as possible in a steady-state 
environment. The TSOC must also task assigned subordinate units to partner with, train, 
and deploy partner forces on behalf of U.S. interests. There are multitudes of instances in 
which SOF can partner with a force and not all partners must be state sponsored. For this 
scenario, a TSOC must first understand the ground dynamic as described by the common 
intelligence picture, and then it should seek those individuals who possess a high degree 
of aptitude, but also have unique access and placement, to could provide area of interest 
confirmation, verify select Iranian targets, and facilitate the emplacement of select 
devices/tools in denied areas. Though these personnel would operate as surrogates of 
sorts, they could pay dividends with minimal risk to U.S. forces. 
H. ADJUST TSOC STRUCTURE 
As shown in Annex D, TSOCs are currently organized based on the J- code model. 
Given that counterproliferation is not an inherently military operation, perhaps a better 
way of organizing SOCCENT to degrade or prevent Iran’s acquisition or development of 
a nuclear weapon capability is to first identify key aspects of Iran’s nuclear programs and 
create teams drawn from across the relevant J-codes that focus on those critical aspects. 
For example, a TSOC could be comprised of teams that focus on key actors, supply chain 
and logistics networks, intelligence-collection, WMD delivery systems, and nuclear 
weapons development. No TSOC is able nor should be expected to address all of these 
areas independently or comprehensively; rather, it is essential to draw upon the vast 
subject matter expertise that resides in the IA. This is achieved by having the relevant IA 
members (IC, DOS, DOE, DOTR, DOC, etc.) connected with each of these teams. By 
doing so, the IA is able to provide critical technical expertise, facilitate information- 
sharing, and manage deconfliction with participating agencies/departments. These 
specialized teams can then feed back into one of the J-codes (most likely J3/operations or 
J5/planning) to ensure that the TSOC’s overall planning and operations efforts for Theater 
SOF are informed by and synthesized with the findings of the specialized teams. 
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I. SUM OF EFFECTS 
This combination of activities could collect meaningful intelligence while also 
preparing the environment for follow-on operations, indirectly deterring Iranian nuclear 
activities, and ultimately contributing to the greater USG Iranian nuclear 
counterproliferation effort. Uniquely challenging, the steady state environment forces the 
TSOC to balance the overt presence and application of SOF, ensuring proper signaling 
while not completely denying its forces ability to collect intelligence. Initially establishing 
a SOCFWD is a critical first step, and becomes a conduit for all other activities. Under 
the SOCFWD(s), intelligence is collected, potential partner forces are identified, and 
infrastructure is established. An effort along these lines, replicated in select countries 
surrounding Iran, would give pause to Iran and its nuclear weapons pursuit. Knowing that 
the U.S. is training forces, actively collecting intelligence, and developing infrastructure 
to potentially use on Iran, is a signal worth pause, and in this scenario, could prove to curb 
Iran’s nuclear activities.  
J. CONCLUSION 
This examination of a TSOC’s role in nuclear counterproliferation scenario offers 
a few possibilities for how a TSOC could be utilized against an adversarial state actor 
should that state signal a desire to pursue a nuclear weapon. This proposed utilization of 
a TSOC is not meant to be used for advanced force operations but rather as a guide to 
enable TSOCs to undertake preparatory actions that would further enable the USG to 
prevent the development or acquisition of a nuclear weapon by a state actor. These 
preparations assume a USG directive to do so and are reflective of a TSOC’s current 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order for TSOCs to properly contribute to USG counterproliferation efforts, 
steps need to be taken to get the TSOCs properly organized, collaborating with the IA, 
and ensure DoD, SOCOM, and TSOC personnel receive proper counterproliferation 
education. We conclude our research by proposing areas for further exploration based off 
the areas our research was not able to address. 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
If TSOCs are to be effective in the global fight against nuclear proliferation, they 
need to be able to do two essential tasks: 
1. View nuclear counterproliferation through the lens of multiple mission 
sets instead of the singular global CWMD mission, and  
2. Continuously work with other TSOCs and the IA to characterize and 
defend against this threat. TSOCs will at a minimum require:  
• In-house expertise on nuclear threats; reliable and unencumbered access 
to USG technical expertise.  
• The ability to dedicate TSOC personnel to focus solely on nuclear threats 
in an operational—vice planning—manner.  
• Dedicated funding, permissive authorities, and enduring concept of 
operations (CONOPs) to enable TSOCs to employ Theater SOF against 
time-sensitive target(s), unburdened by the bureaucracy and decision-
making procedures that normally inhibits DoD involvement in 
counterproliferation operations.  
• Less focus on strategic objectives, end states, and campaign plans, and 
more focus on operational goals, developing options, gaining approvals, 
and concurrent planning with the threat space’s evolution. 
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Though some of these recommendations will be easier to implement than others, 
the key takeaway is if DoD, SOCOM, and the TSOCs want to be effective and proficient 
in counterproliferation operations, then they must put aside the traditional military 
mindset of doctrine, MDMP, and “six phases of war.” In their place, TSOCs should adopt 
a mission-oriented structure that is backed by a thorough understanding of the problem, 
as well as, their intended effects and the personnel and resources necessary to achieve 
those effects. 
B. MORE EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION WITH THE IA 
The IA, namely the IC and the DOC, DOE, DOS, and DOTR have been working 
proliferation issues for decades. This level of expertise and institutional knowledge is a 
resource that DoD, SOCOM, and the TSOCs should leverage as much as possible given 
their collective lack of knowledge of nuclear weapons and experience in contending with 
proliferation threats. This collaboration can take on multiple forms but two stand out from 
the rest: 
1. Assign more SOCOM personnel to collaborate, counterproliferation 
focused working groups within the IA, and  
2. Establish one point of contact for all DoD proliferation matters, internally 
and externally.  
One of the counterproliferation-focused working groups is the Strategic 
Interdiction Group (SIG). The SIG is arguably one of the most effective tools the USG 
possesses to counter proliferation threats at the tactical and operational levels. The current 
level of SOCOM representation is insufficient to effectively advocate and represent 
SOCOM interests at the SIG. For SOCOM to effectively integrate with the SIG, or any of 
the other IA counterproliferation focused working groups, SOCOM representatives must 
to be able to do the following:  
• Work at the SIG long enough so that the in-processing requirements do 
not consume upwards of half their allocated time at the SIG;  
• Possess first-hand working knowledge of how SOF operates;  
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• Be empowered by SOCOM to make decisions and reach out to the 
necessary subordinate commands/units as needed;  
• Possess a working knowledge of nuclear devices and proliferation issues 
prior to their assignment; 
• Possesses an ability to think along asymmetric, non-linear pathways; and  
• Read into appropriate DoD/SOCOM programs to prevent knowledge 
gaps.  
• To fulfill these requirements, more than one SOCOM representative 
should be selected for duty at the SIG.  
With respect to a singular point of contact for all proliferation matters concerning 
DoD, we recommend the use of the SOCOM CWMD Fusion Center. The SOCOM 
CWMD Fusion Center was established to be the action arm of SOCOM as SOCOM took 
over the CWMD coordinating authority role for DoD. If they are to be effective, then it is 
in the best interest of DoD, SOCOM and the Fusion Center for the Fusion Center to be 
the single point of contact for all DoD commands, to include TSOCs, contending with 
nuclear (as well as chemical, biological, and radiological) proliferation issues. This could 
facilitate maintaining an accurate departmental common operating picture.  The Fusion 
Center should also serve as the single voice and point of contact for DoD when engaging 
with the IA at the working/O-6 and below level. This would most likely entail the 
commitment of significant funding, personnel, and resources so that the Fusion Center 
can recruit, develop, and employ the subject matter experts needed to effectively and 
routinely engage with the entire USG on nuclear proliferation issues. 
C. WHERE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF TSOCS LIE 
Success for TSOCs and Theater SOF would constitute bolstering ongoing IA 
nuclear counterproliferation efforts. Theater SOF’s contribution to nuclear 
counterproliferation efforts will most likely fall within the realm of: Special Activities, 
Intelligence Collection, Information/Cyber Operations, the use of Theater Platforms, and 
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the employment of HN Partners. These skill sets have been honed over 17 years of 
sustained counterterrorism operations; however, they are limited in scope and Theater 
SOF is not suitably trained for every aspect of nuclear counterproliferation operations. In 
particular, when these operations deal with the technical aspects of nuclear weapons, 
TSOCs and Theater SOF will require IA SME support. Relying on IA SME support 
lessens the burden on TSOCs and Theater SOF by not forcing them to develop, train to, 
and sustain another skillset in addition to the litany of skills they are already required to 
maintain. The effectiveness of TSOCs and Theater SOF’s contribution will rest in 
skillfully adapting and applying what they currently do in counterterrorism operations to 
nuclear counterproliferation efforts. 
D. EDUCATING THE FORCE 
In addition to the TSOCs taking a more intelligence-collection-based approach to 
the counterproliferation fight, the other area where significant attention is needed is 
education. For several reasons, including longstanding focus on counterterrorism, 
operational tempo, lack of prioritization of the counterproliferation fight within DoD, 
TSOCs often lack the institutional knowledge and subject matter expertise that is required 
to effectively participate in nuclear counterproliferation efforts. Though some TSOCs 
have a nuclear counterproliferation cell of sorts, the personnel assigned to staff these 
positions are often under-resourced and insufficiently educated on nuclear devices, 
networks, and policy. Conducting nuclear counterproliferation operations not only 
requires the skill sets of planning and tactics, but also demands a fundamental 
understanding of how these weapon systems work, what components they consist of, 
where the material and expertise can come from, as well as the variety of methods for 
employment.  
Within DoD, there are several institutions that offer nuclear counterproliferation 
education, such as the National Defense University (NDU), the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) and the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). To ensure that TSOCs, 
SOCOM, and the DoD as a whole are receiving the same education, we recommend the 
development of an internal DoD WMD educational plan which combines the nuclear 
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counterproliferation (as well as chemical, biological and radiological) resources of NDU, 
NPS, JSOU and the other education programs within DoD into a unified 
counterproliferation “base-line of knowledge” available at each of the institutions. This 
unified program, in conjunction with IA counterproliferation educational resources, could 
then work to establish a base-line knowledge and understanding of the issues surrounding 
proliferation. Furthermore, this base-line knowledge, along with prioritizing DoD 
personnel participation in ongoing IA counterproliferation courses, will enable DoD 
personnel to gain understanding and expertise on these topics. This will enable the 
development of relationships between counterproliferation professionals. 
E. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Two years after assuming the role as DoD synchronizer for CWMD, SOCOM 
continues to fully define its role in the CWMD mission space.  There remains plenty of 
exploration with regard to their new mission, and more broadly, the entire USG 
counterproliferation enterprise.  This research project conceptually yielded how TSOCs 
and their assigned Theater SOF can better contribute to the USG’s nuclear 
counterproliferation effort, specifically against an adversarial state actor.  Throughout the 
course of this research, there were several prominent questions that went beyond the scope 
of this project and are worth further exploration: 
As DoD’s planning model is more of a hindrance when applied to the 
counterproliferation effort, is there a viable planning model that would be more conducive 
for integrating counterproliferation missions with the IA? 
This research identified that DoD planning as it is today is incompatible with the 
IA model. While DoD uses an antiquated model, based on moving large formations and 
making deliberate contact with a defined enemy force, the IA’s planning model is less 
formal but oriented toward the speed in which action can be taken against a target—not 
necessarily a defined enemy. While this model is predicated on speed of action, 
commander approval is central to DoD’s model. While both models have their merit, 
DoD’s is not suitable for counterproliferation operations. Developing a practical planning 
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model that blends speed of action with approval requirements may benefit SOCOM as it 
becomes more involved with counterproliferation and the IA.  
How does a TSOC restructure itself to be mission-oriented and integrate SMEs 
with its forces? 
This research suggests that TSOCs, in their current functional organizational 
structure, are not optimized nor educationally equipped to solve complex issues like 
counterproliferation. TSOCs must therefore change organizationally. Proposing a viable, 
mission center-structured TSOC and a methodology for integrating SME support could 
prepare TSOCs to better contend with WMD proliferation and other amorphous problems. 
If granted approval to enter Iran in a CWMD capacity, how would Theater SOF 
be best employed in a steady state nuclear proliferation scenario? 
Theater SOF offers a range of capabilities to devote to the USG CWMD effort, 
but absent the authorization to enter Iran, it can only do so much.  However, should 
political and senior military leaders determine that the situation in Iran warrants approving 
Theater SOF to enter the country, it would be prudent to explore the exact capacity in 




APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR USG ORGANIZATIONS 
THAT ARE INVOLVED IN COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
The following government entities, primarily taken from Who’s Who in the Zoo 
by Shawn Powers, have distinct responsibilities within the USG counterproliferation 
effort. The descriptions from Shawn Powers are not from official USG documents. 
A. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
Counterproliferation Mission Center (CPMC). “Combines operational and analytic 
specialists that are dedicated to combating the spread of dangerous weapons and 
technology. The Counterproliferation Mission Center is led by an undercover NCS 
officer, with deputies for operations and analysis.”53  
 
Interdiction & Counterproliferation Facilitation (ICPF). “Develops, facilitates and 
coordinates IC efforts to advance a strategic approach to interdiction, primarily oriented 
through the SIG. ICPF is also engaged in activities pertinent to proliferation networks, 
how they operate, and how critical chokepoints and vulnerabilities might be 
identified.”54 
 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). “The WMD-CT leads NCTC’s approach 
to terrorist threats involving WMD by integrating intelligence analysis, collection 
management, information sharing, and policy planning across the Center. The WMD-CT 
office consolidates functions previously divided between the Directorate of Strategic 
Operational Planning, Directorate of Intelligence, and the Office of National Intelligence 
Management for Counterterrorism. It also builds on the WMD-Terrorism Integration 
Office, which was established to strengthen NCTC’s relationship with the NCPC on 
WMD issues.”55 
 
National Intelligence Manager (NIM). “NIMS serve as the single focal point within 
the ODNI for all activities related to their portfolios. They are the DNI’s principal 
advisors for community oversight and coordination of their respective mission area and 
are responsible for the development and implementation of one or more Unifying 
Intelligence Strategies. NIMs are categorized as regional, country or functionally. They 
integrate the ICs collection and analytic efforts; are responsible for intelligence mission 
management within their area of responsibility, and maintain senior-level contacts 
                                                 
53 “CIA Launches New Counterproliferation Center,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 29, 2013, 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-2010/cia-launches-new-
counterproliferation-center.html.  
54 Shawn Powers, Who’s Who in the Zoo (Fayetteville, NC: USASOC, 2016), 7. (S) 
55 Powers, 7. 
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within the intelligence, policymaking, and warfighting communities to ensure the full 
range of informational needs related to their mission area are met.”56 
 
B. COMMERCE 
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). “The mission of BIS export enforcement is to 
protect U.S. national security, homeland security, foreign policy, and economic interests 
through law enforcement programs focused on: sensitive exports to hostile entities or 
those that engage in onward proliferation; prohibited foreign boycotts; and related public 
safety laws.”57 
C. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP). “The Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is 
responsible for border security, including counterterrorism, customs, immigration, trade, 
and agriculture.”58 “CBP participates in commodity identification and interdiction 
methodologies. The DHS goal with the EXBS program is to prevent the proliferation of 
WMD and destabilizing accumulations and irresponsible transfers of conventional 
weapons by helping to build effective national strategic trade control systems in 
countries that possess, produce, or supply strategic items, as well as in countries through 
which such items are most likely to transit.”59 
 
Export Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C2). “The E2C2 serves as the primary 
forum within the federal government for executive departments and agencies to 
coordinate and enhance their export control enforcement efforts. The Center maximizes 
information sharing, consistent with national security and applicable laws. This helps 
partner agencies detect, prevent, disrupt, investigate and prosecute violations of U.S. 
export control laws. HSI, as part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
manages and operates the Export Enforcement Coordination Center.”60 
 
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). “U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement’s (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Counter-Proliferation 
Investigations (CPI) program prevents sensitive U.S. technologies and weapons from 
reaching terrorists, criminal organizations and foreign adversaries. The CPI program 
combats the trafficking and illegal export of commodities and services.”61 
                                                 
56 Powers, 7. 
57 Powers, 5.  
58 “What We Do,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, accessed October 31, 2018, 
https://www.cbp.gov/careers/cbpo-what-we-do.  
59 Powers, 5.  
60 Powers, 5.  
61 Powers, 5.  
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D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). “Works with rest of the U.S. government, 
allies and partner countries, and international organizations to counter WMD and 
improvised threats. As the DoD’s research and development leader focused on WMD 
and improvised threats, DTRA facilitates innovation as we combine traditional research 
with unconventional means to develop and quickly field solutions to the most complex, 
deadly and urgent threats facing the U.S. and the rest of the world.”62 
 
SOCOM CWMD Fusion Center. “A relative newcomer to the interagency, SOCOMs 
CWMD Fusion Center is the nexus A nexus of CWMD awareness, active planning, and 
operational advocacy across functional and geographic missions.”63 
 
E. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
The Office of Nonproliferation (NNSA). “Established by Congress in 2000, NNSA is 
a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for 
enhancing national security through the military application of nuclear science. NNSA 
maintains and enhances the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear 
weapons stockpile without nuclear explosive testing; works to reduce the global danger 
from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective 
nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the U.S. 
and abroad.”64 
 
The Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD). “Works with 
international partners to strengthen capabilities to deter, detect, and investigate the 
smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials by providing the expertise and tools 
needed to respond to smuggling events.”65 
 
                                                 
62 “Who We Are,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency, accessed October 27, 2018, 
http://www.dtra.mil/About/Who-We-Are/.  
63 Reviewing Department of Defense Strategy, Policy, and Programs for Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (CWMD) for Fiscal Year 2019, U.S. Congress, House Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities Subcommittee Committee on Armed Services, (2018) (Statement of Vayl Oxford), 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20180322/108018/HHRG-115-AS26-Wstate-OxfordV-
20180322.pdf.  
64 “About NNSA,” Department of Energy, accessed October 27, 2018, 
https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/about-nnsa.  
65 “NNSA and Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence,” Department of Energy, accessed 
August 25, 2018, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/nnsa-and-nuclear-smuggling-detection-and-deterrence. 
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F. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) 
FBI Counterproliferation Center. “The CPC combines the counterproliferation 
expertise of our Counterintelligence Division, WMD Directorate, and Directorate of 
Intelligence. All FBI counterproliferation investigations are managed by the CPC, which 
leverages law enforcement and intelligence techniques to prevent the acquisition of 
WMD and critical controlled technologies.”66  
G. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
Bureau of International Security & Non-Proliferation (ISN). “Combating WMD 
through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy is one of the highest priorities of the 
Department of State. The ISN Bureau leads State’s efforts to prevent the spread of 
WMD — whether nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological — and their delivery 
systems.”67  ”ISN is responsible for managing a broad range of U.S. nonproliferation 
policies, programs, agreements, and initiatives,”68 including the Export Control and 
Related Border Security (EXBS) Program. 
 
H. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). “FinCEN’s mission is to 
safeguard the U.S. financial system from illicit use, combat money laundering, and 
promote national security through the collection, analysis, dissemination of financial 
intelligence, and the strategic use of financial authorities.”69 
 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). “The OFAC administers and enforces 
economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals 
against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics 
traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of WMD, and other 
threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States. OFAC 
acts under presidential national emergency powers, as well as authority granted by 
specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze assets under U.S. 
jurisdiction. Many sanctions are based on UN and other international mandates, are 
multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied governments.”70 
 
                                                 
66 “FBI Counterproliferation Center,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed August 25, 2018, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-branch/fbi-counterproliferation-
center.  
67 Powers, 5.  
68 “Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat,” U.S. Department of State, n.d., 
https://www.state.gov/t/isn/wmd/. 
69 Powers, 5 
70 Powers, 5 
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APPENDIX B. WHAT EACH USG ORGANIZATION OFFERS TO 
THE COUNTERPROLIFERATION FIGHT 
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APPENDIX C. NOTIONAL THEATER COMMAND 
ORGANIZATION 
 
Figure 2. Notional Theater Command Organization71 
  
                                                 
71 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–05, III-8. 
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Figure 3. Notional Theater Special Operations Command 
Organization72 
  
                                                 
72 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–05, III-6. 
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APPENDIX E. SPECIAL OPERATIONS NOTIONAL COMMAND 
AND CONTROL OPTIONS 
 
Figure 4. Special Operations Notional Command and Control 
Options73 
  
                                                 
73 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–05, III-13. 
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APPENDIX F. PARTIAL LIST OF CURRENT IA 
NONPROLIFERATION AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
COURSES 
• Advanced Missile Technology Course 
• Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Seminar 
• Fuel Fabrication Course 
• Fundamentals of Missile System Design Technology Relevant to Dual-
Use Export Controls 
• Gas Centrifuge Technology 
• Heavy Water Production, Reactors, and Tritium Production 
• Introduction to Missile Production Technology Relevant to Dual-Use 
Export Controls 
• Introduction to Nuclear Material Security, Transportation, and Material 
Process Flow 
• Nonproliferation for High Risk Property and Export Controlled 
Technology Workshop 
• Nuclear Device Proliferation Intelligence Course 
• Nuclear Energy Proliferation Intelligence Overview 
• Nuclear Fuel Cycle Operations 
• Nuclear Nonproliferation Seminar 
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• Nuclear Nonproliferation Seminar: Reactors and the Commercial Nuclear 
Industry 










APPENDIX G. THEATER SOF SKILL SETS THAT COULD BE 
LEVERAGED AGAINST A STATE ACTOR 
Leveraging Theater SOF skill sets in a steady-state environment: 
 
• Aide in characterizing, illuminating, and if necessary, interdicting 
activities of proliferation concern taking place on maritime smuggling 
routes. Theater maritime assets cannot affect interior or coastal nuclear 
sites.  
• Monitor border areas in order to observe and/or interdict potential 
smuggling routes.  
• Set conditions to RSO&I and infiltrate NMF if needed. 
• Provide initial infrastructure and C2 capabilities. 
• Map cyber/cellular/radio networks. 
• Passive observation of roads, infrastructure, people, businesses, and 
vehicles. 
• Area Familiarization.  
• Site Survey of roads and infrastructure. 
• Mapping the information environment. 
• Military Source Operations. 
• Development of NAR capabilities.  
• Development of courier networks.  
• Development of safe houses and assembly areas.  
• Preposition transportation assets.  
• Cache emplacement and recovery of Theater platforms and assets.  
• Close-target reconnaissance.  
• Interdict nuclear components, scientists, other forms of support that are 
entering or leaving sovereign territory. 
 
Leveraging organic Theater SOF skill sets in a conflict environment: 
 
This assumes that Theater SOF is authorized to enter into sovereign territory. 
 
• Aide in characterizing, illuminating, and if necessary, interdicting 
maritime smuggling activities. (Note: Theater maritime assets cannot 
affect interior nuclear sites, but could potentially affect coastal- based 
nuclear infrastructure and support networks.)  
• Monitor border areas in order to observe potential smuggling routes 
and/or interdict transfers of proliferation concern.  
• Set conditions to RSO&I and infiltrate NMF if needed. 
• Provide initial infrastructure and C2 capabilities. 
• Map cyber/cellular/radio networks (time permitting). 
• Conduct passive observation of roads, infrastructure, people, businesses, 
and vehicles. 
50 
• Map the information environment. 
• Conduct Military Source Operations. 
• Emplace caches and recover Theater platforms and assets.  
• Conduct close-target reconnaissance. 
• Conduct Terminal Guidance.  
• Interdict shipments or movements of proliferation concern that are 
entering or leaving Iran. 
• Cordon off key areas. 
• Provide transportation and protection to SMEs to and from designated 
areas. 
• Conduct Area Familiarization of key sites (limited). 
• Conduct Site Survey of key sites (limited). 
• Develop NAR capabilities (limited).  
• Develop courier networks (limited).  
• Develop safe houses and assembly areas (limited). 
• Identify key elements of Iranian nuclear weapons-related infrastructure 
(limited ability independent of outside SME assistance). 
 
51 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Albright, David. Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s 
Enemies. New York, NY: Free Press, 2010.  
Arms Control Association. “Chronology of Libya’s Disarmament and Relations with the 
United States.” January 1, 2018. 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology.  
Bonds, Timothy, Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, and Richard E. Darilek. Strategy-Policy 
Mismatch: How the U.S. Army Can Help Close Gaps in Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/j.ctt14bs2zp.10.pdf. 
Carlson, Lonnie, and Kosal Margaret. “Preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation: Leveraging Special Operations Forces to Shape the Environment.” 
Occasional Paper, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, JSOU 
Press, 2017. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=798283.  
Chemical Weapons Convention. “Looking Back Helps Us Look Forward.” Accessed 
September 30, 2018. https://www.opcw.org/about-chemical-weapons/history-of-
cw-use/.  




Clapper, James. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. 
Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Defense, 2013. 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2013%20ATA%2
0SFR%20for%20SSCI%2012%20Mar%202013.pdf.  
Cunningham, William, Brian J. Dowd, Samuel Kim, Tad T. K. Tsuneyoshi, and Adam 
Woytowich. “Too Big To Fail: The U.S. Government Counter Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Enterprise.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. 
Davis, Zachary, Michael Nacht, and Ronald Lehman. Strategic Latency and World 
Power: How Technology Is Changing Our Concepts of Security. Livermore, CA: 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2014. 
https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Strategic_Latency.pdf.  
Defense Threat Reduction Agency. “Who We Are.” Accessed October 27, 2018, 
http://www.dtra.mil/About/Who-We-Are/. 
52 
Department of Defense. “Unified Combatant Commands.” Accessed April 29, 2018, 
https://archive.defense.gov/ucc/.  
Department of Energy. “About NNSA.” Accessed October 27, 2018, 
https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/about-nnsa.  
———. “NNSA and Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence.” Accessed August 
25, 2018. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/nnsa-and-nuclear-smuggling-detection-
and-deterrence.  
Department of State. “Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN).” 
Accessed August 15, 2018. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/ 
Everts, Sarah. “A Brief History of Chemical War.” Distillations Magazine. April 17, 
2017. https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/magazine/a-brief-history-of-
chemical-war.  
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “FBI Counterproliferation Center.” Accessed August 
25, 2018. https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-
branch/fbi-counterproliferation-center. 
Hecker, Siegfried. “What to Make of North Korea’s Latest Nuclear Test.” 38 North, 
September 12, 2016. http://38north.org/2016/09/shecker091216/. 
Heinonen, Olli. “Lessons Learned from Dismantlement of South Africa’s Biological, 
Chemical, and Nuclear Weapons Programs.” The Nonproliferation Review 23, 
no. 1–2 (March 3, 2016): 147–62. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2016.1182685.  
Joint Chiefs of Staff. DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, 
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018. 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. 
———. Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments. 
JP 3–11. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013. 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_11.pdf.  
———. Special Operations. JP 3–05. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014. 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf.   
———. Special Operations PE EXORD. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012. 
(S) 
Kerr, Paul. Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status. CRS Report No. RL34544. Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=793499. 
53 
Kerr, Paul, and Mary Beth Nikitin. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons. CRS Report No. 
RL34248. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf.  
Korean Central News Agency of DPRK via Korea News Service. “DPRK Succeeds in 
Nuclear Warhead Explosion Test.” September 9, 2016. 
www.kcna.co.jp/item/2016/201609/news09/ 20160909-33ee.html.   
Lee, Matthew. “US Reimposes all Iran Sanctions Filed under Nuclear Deal.” The 




Liddell-Hart, Basil. Strategy. 2d ed. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 
Mattis, Jim. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of 
America. Washington, DC: Pentagon, 2018. 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
Miller, Nicolas L. “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions.” International 
Organization 68, issue 4(October 2014). 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=e027e92b-
987a-40ea-b173-9728d70fe7ee%40sessionmgr4007.   
Nikitin, Mary Beth. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current 
Developments. CRS Report No. RL33548. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2016. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33548.pdf.  
Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Iran.” May 2018. https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/. 
———. “North Korea,” May 2018. https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-
korea/nuclear/.  
———. “Syria.” April 2018. https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/syria/.  
Perkins, David G. “Multi-Domain Battle: The Advent of Twenty-First Century War.” 




Powers, Shawn. Who’s Who in the Zoo. G39. Fayetteville, NC: USASOC, 2016. (S) 
54 
Reiss, Mitchell B. “The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects for a World of Many Nuclear 
Weapons States.” In The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their 
Nuclear Choices (2004), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/nucleartippingpoint_chapter.pdf.  
Robinson, Linda. The future of U.S. special operations forces. Council on Foreign 
Relations report no. 66. New York, NY, 2013.  https://www.cfr.org/report/future-
us-special-operations-forces.  
 Robinson, Linda, Austin Long, Kimberly Jackson, and Rebeca Orrie. Improving the 
Understanding of Special Operations. RR-2026. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2026.html. 
Shah, Saeed. “India and Pakistan Escalate Nuclear Arms Race.” The Wall Street 
Journal. March 31, 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/india-and-pakistan-
escalate-nuclear-arms-race-1490983537. 
Shi, Kevin, and Paul Scharre. “Phases of War and the Iraq Experience.” War on the 
Rocks. November 22, 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/phases-of-war-
and-the-iraq-experience/.  
Sokolski, Henry. Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future. 2nd ed. 
Arlington, VA: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2016. 
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1310.   
Stanfield, Erik. “Lost in Translation: Lessons from Counterterrorism for a More 
Proactive Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy.” Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2017. https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/55539. 
Tisdel, Michael, Ken Teske, and William Fleser. Theater Special Operations Commands 
Realignment. ADA607289. MacDill AFB, FL: USSOCOM, 2014. 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a607289.pdf. 
Tobey, William. “Cooperation in the Libya WMD Disarmament Case.” Studies in 
Intelligence 61, no. 4 (December 2017). https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-
the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-61-no-
4/pdfs/libya-nuclear-deal.pdf. 
Trump, Donald. National Security Strategy for the United States of America. 
Washington, DC: White House, 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.  
United States Special Operations Command. “SOF Truths.” Accessed October 16, 2018. 
https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths. 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. “What We Do.” Accessed October 31, 2018. 
https://www.cbp.gov/careers/cbpo-what-we-do.  
55 
Walker, David L. “Refining the MDMP for Operational Adaptability.” Small Wars 
Journal, October 15, 2011. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/refining-the-
mdmp-for-operational-adaptability.  
Woolshlager, Richard, and Wright, Fredrick. “Force of Choice: Optimizing Theater 
Special Operations Commands to Achieve Synchronized Effects.” Master’s 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
57 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
